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The progressive introduction of markets in higher education seems to lead
to ever-higher prices for students and their families, at least in the industrialised
world. Between 2000 and 2011, the share of private investments in higher edu-
cation has increased in more than 75 % of OECD countries (OECD 2014). In the
United States, for instance, tuition fees for in-state students have risen by 42 % over
10 years, and have more than doubled over the last 20 years to just over €7000 (US
$ 9139) per year (College Board 2014). Historical data is harder to obtain for
Europe, but fees now exist in a majority of countries, with universities usually
charging between €1000 and €5000 per year (Eurydice 2014). Many countries are
considering to introduce fees or to raise existing fees, although there are some
notable exceptions.1 As tuition fees continue to rise, there is much public anxiety
about how these may affect enrolment and inequality. Yet, there is little empirical
evidence of how recent fee increases affect student choices, at least in Europe.
Commentators widely agree that higher prices may affect student enrolment and
inequality, but opinions differ about the direction of the effect. The debate is divided
between what I will call—in simpliﬁed terms—‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists’.
‘Pessimists’ typically argue that fees may be a risky investment in the students’
future. Referring to empirical work on student price responsiveness (Dearden et al.
2011; Heller 1997; Leslie and Brinkman 1987), they expect that higher price could
push a substantial group of students off the market. They point out that students
from lower social backgrounds can be particularly affected, since the price is higher
for them in relative terms. ‘Optimists’ argue that higher fees (especially in
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combination with student support) may have a (marginally) positive effect on
enrolment and inequality (Carneiro and Heckman 2002; Shavit et al. 2007). The
higher fee may not be a barrier for access, since the returns to a university degree
would still be higher than the new price, and demand far outstrips supply (Becker
1993).
This paper aims to contribute to this debate by analysing the fee increase in
English higher education in 2012. A number of papers have investigated the effects
of increases in tuition fees in earlier years (Boliver 2011; Dearden et al. 2008) and
there have been a few reports on what happened after the 2012 reforms (Orr et al.
2011; UCAS 2012). Until now, however, no article has yet investigated the effects
of the most recent changes using a semi-experimental research design, at least to my
knowledge. This paper presents a ﬁrst such analysis by exploiting differences in
rules for different groups of students in the United Kingdom. Indeed, only English
and students from other European Union countries were faced with the price
increase, while all other students (Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, International
non-EU) were not affected. The research question is “How did the 2012 reforms of
university funding affect university enrolments and inequality in England?” This
question will be subdivided in four sub-questions,2 namely:
1. What is the effect of the 2012 reforms on enrolment in general?
2. What is the effect of the 2012 reforms on enrolment of students in different age
groups?
3. What is the effect of the 2012 reforms on enrolment of students from different
socio-economic backgrounds?
4. What is the effect of the 2012 reforms on enrolment of students from different
ethnic groups?
Beyond the empirical case, this paper contributes to the tradition in the literature
on the elasticity of demand for higher education (for an overview, cf. Heller 1997;
Kane 2004). Increasingly, researchers are using semi-experimental designs to
identify the causal effect of price changes on student enrolment (Dynarski 2003;
Hübner 2012). This study aims to make two contributions to this literature: (1) it
studies a major price change for a large group of students, whereas previous studies
usually analyse small price changes for small groups. (2) it analyses how the price
increase has affected inequality, a relation which remains little understood (Kane
2004).
2It should be noted here, already, that these questions only address one dimension of inequality,
namely inequality in access to university, something sociologists refer to as ‘vertical inequality’
(Gerber and Cheung 2008). The effects on ‘horizontal inequality’ will be analysed in a separate
paper employing a similar research design. The question is then whether students who are studying
in a market environment make substantively different choices (for different universities or different
subject ﬁelds).
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2 The 2012 Reforms
The 2012 reform involved more than just a hike in tuition fees. The main elements
of the reform are (1) universities charge higher tuition fees, (2) public subsidies
were redirected to students rather than universities, and (3) regulation on student
enrolments was loosened. These reforms happened in parallel, leading to the
establishment of a pseudo-market for higher education in England (Ansell 2010;
Brown 2013). As a former vice-chancellor of a British university recently stated,
“[h]igher education has been privatised right under our noses. And no one is
taking any notice”.3 Each of these aspects will be dealt with here in turn.
Table 1 also gives a short summary of the policy changes. As good overviews exist
of the 2012 reforms (Brown 2013; Chowdry et al. 2012; McGettigan 2013) I will
give only the briefest summary of the changes here.
First, the costs of higher education have been steadily passed on from the
government to students and their families.4 Whereas English students in the late
1990s paid nothing for an entire undergraduate degree, they now pay just over
€11,000 (£9000) per year or close to €34,000 (£27,000) for a typical undergraduate
degree. Figure 1 gives an overview of the evolution of the annual costs of studying
at university for different groups over the last 10 years.
This ﬁgure shows two important variations in fee levels. (a) Fees for English and
EU students5 have risen in two sharp jumps, namely in 2006/07 and 2012/13. These
fee increases were part of two major reforms in English higher education, namely
the 2004 Higher Education Act, and the “Browne review” of student ﬁnance in
2010. Each of these reforms raised the maximum amount (or ‘cap’) of money that a
university could ask from an undergraduate student. (b) The ﬁgure also makes clear
that the increases in fees were not spread equally across the regions. In Scotland,
fees were gradually abolished, whereas students from Wales and Northern Ireland
remain subsidised to keep their tuition fee level at pre-2012 prices. Meanwhile,
international (non-EU) students face—more or less—stable prices since 2010.
Secondly, the funding from the government has changed fundamentally. Direct
funding for higher education has almost completely dried up. Whereas British
universities received 80 % of its funding from the state in 1995, this was reduced to
30 % by 2011, the biggest change in any of the OECD countries6 (OECD 2014).
3Roger Brown, Quoted in The Observer, Sunday 12 October 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/
education/2014/oct/12/have-universities-been-privatised-by-stealth.
4In the higher education literature, this phenomenon is often referred to as ‘cost-sharing’.
5Due to European Union legislation, universities cannot discriminate their prices between students
from different EU member states. They can, however, discriminate prices between members of the
same country. This awkward glitch in legislation have led to the paradoxical situation that allows
for the difference-in-differences design.
6The OECD average was 69 % in 2011 (i.e. in 2011 the average university in OECD countries
received 69 % of its funding from public sources).
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In 2012, universities only received 23 % of total income from the government.7 The
budget for teaching was indeed reduced strongly; the Institute for Fiscal Studies
estimated that the reduction was −86 % (Chowdry et al. 2012, p. 232) leaving little
Table 1 Overview of policy changes affecting new undergraduate enrolments from the academic
year 2012/2013
Policy area Pre 2012/13 Post 2012/13
Tuition
fees
Capped at £3000 Capped at £9000
Funding to
universities
‘Cost sharing’ philosophy—mix of
public and private funding (from
tuition fees and other private
sources)
Mostly private, after cuts to subsidies
to higher education institutions
Student
support
Grants for poor students, and
separate loans for tuition fees and
living costs
More generous grants for poor
students, higher loans to compensate





Each university is allocated a
maximum number of students to
recruit
Basic number of students is still ﬁxed,
but universities are free to compete for
85,000 student places
Fig. 1 Evolution of fees in nominal prices (i.e. not corrected for inflation). Note Prices for
international students are averages for classroom-based subjects. Sources OFFA, BBC, The
Guardian, Reddin survey of tuition fees
7See https://www.hesa.ac.uk/pr201 for the ﬁgures on different sources of income of universities in
England.
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of what was left. Much of this funding has been redirected to the students’ loans
system, thereby only indirectly providing support to the universities.
Rather than subsidising universities directly, the English government now sup-
ports students through a programme of loans and grants. Students can take out a
‘tuition fee loan’ to pay for their fees. They can also take a ‘maintenance loan’ to
pay for their living costs. These loans have to be repaid to the state after the student
stops studying and reaches a certain level of income (currently students pay back
9 % on a yearly income earned above €26,000—or £21,000). Students from
low-income families are eligible for maintenance grants and scholarships to support
their living costs. The Student Loans Company estimates that 87 % of students in
England take out a tuition fee loan, and a large majority (84 % of all students taking
out loans) take out both a tuition fee loan and a maintenance loan.8
Thirdly, the government relaxed the so-called ‘student numbers controls’ on
universities. To allow some sort of control over how much money goes around in
the student loans’ system, the funding council imposed a maximum number of
students that universities could enrol. From 2012/13 universities were allowed to
freely recruit students that had a minimum level of demonstrated ability (i.e. grades
or qualiﬁcations). Universities were completely free to recruit part-time students,
whatever their demonstrated ability. Although the number of students for which
free recruitment was possible was initially small (estimated at 85,000 students),9
this change allowed universities to mount recruitment campaigns in order to catch a
larger market share.
In sum, the main elements of the new market in higher education are a (1) a price
mechanism, (2) universities are dependent on the student market for their ﬁnancial
survival (through a reduction of public subsidies), and (3) a mechanism linking
supply and demand (through relaxing student number controls). Importantly, since
each of these elements changed in parallel, there is little sense in estimating the
effect of only one of these changes on student enrolment. The next section will ask
what theoretical expectations are about the effect of the policy changes on student
choices.
3 Competing Expectations About the Effects
of the Reforms
Earlier theoretical and empirical work holds competing expectations about how the
reforms may affect enrolment and inequality. I will outline below why some may
expect the reforms to lead to reduced student numbers and to increased inequality
(the pessimist view), and why others will expect marketisation to increase student
8See Statistical First Release 05/2013, published in November 2013. http://www.slc.co.uk/media/
694170/slcsfr052013.pdf.
9Department of Business Innovation and Skills (2011). White Paper: Students at the Heart of the
System. London: TSO.
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enrolments and to maintain or even decrease inequality (the optimist view). While I
will give a simpliﬁed account of the complex literature on tuition fees, my goal here
is only to show that we may have competing expectations about how fees affect
student enrolment.
3.1 The Pessimists’ View: Lower Enrolment and Higher
Inequality
As discussed above, the main element of the 2012 reform is perhaps the change in
prices. From the perspective of both classical human capital theory (Becker 1993)
and sociological rational action theory (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997) we may expect
that higher costs may decrease enrolment and increase inequality. If prices go up,
this may present a barrier for the marginal student who may not consider higher
education a worthy investment. Everything else being equal, then, we may expect
higher prices to lead to lower demand, and thus lower enrolment levels for those
affected by higher prices.10
There exists a rich body of empirical work on these phenomena, primarily from
the United States. Early reviews, such as Leslie and Brinkman’s (1987), showed
that a substantial increase in prices usually led to a reduction in demand. On
average, they found that a price increase of $100 led to a reduction in demand of
about 0.7 %. Subsequent reviews have found slightly smaller price effects, and
typically use a $1000 price change to estimate demand effects (cf. Dynarski 2003;
Kane 1995). A recent study in Canada has found for instance, that an increase in
prices of $1000 led to a decrease in enrolment between 2.5 and 5 %. In the United
Kingdom, a price increase of £1000 has found to reduce enrolment by 3.9 %
(Dearden et al. 2011).
With regards to inequality, quite a few studies argue that tuition fee hikes
disproportionally affect students from lower social backgrounds. An update to
Leslie and Brinkman’s study (Heller 1997) argues that students from poor families
have a different demand curve. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in several studies.
McPherson and Schapiro (1991) found that low-income white students were more
responsive to price changes. Similarly, Coelli (2009) found this to be the case in
Canada.
While some credit constraints may be offset by the English student support
system, certain students may still be ‘risk averse’ (Pratt 1964). From the perspective
of Rational Action Theory (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997), one can expect that
students from lower social classes are more risk averse than students from higher
10As always, the question is to what extent everything else is really equal. As returns to higher
education remain, on average, higher than the costs, it is by no means guaranteed that higher prices
will reduce enrolment from this perspective.
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status families. This argument has been used to explain why students from lower
social classes are diverted away from university in Germany (Hillmert and Jacobs
2003). For higher social strata, the monetary costs of attending university may be
offset by the social costs of not attending higher education. In other words, there are
many reasons to expect a stronger decrease in enrolment for students from lower
social classes.
3.2 The Optimists’ View: Higher Enrolment and Lower
Inequality
There are several serious counter-arguments to be given against the pessimist view.
Firstly, how to square ever higher-prices with ever-higher enrolment rates?
Time-series data at the macro-level that show an ever increasing rise in college
attendance over the last century (cf. Schofer and Meyer 2005). Secondly, why do
systems with higher fees also have overall higher enrolment rates than those
without fees, and why are such systems typically more inclusive (Shavit et al.
2007)? Finally, why were several empirical studies not able to conﬁrm a higher
price responsiveness of students from poor families (prominent examples include
Carneiro and James 2002; Ellwood and Kane 2000).
Leslie and Brinkman (1987, p. 200ff), already offered a wide variety of expla-
nations for this phenomenon. Two of these issues may be particularly important for
the English case. One important issue seems to be selectivity. Cameron and
Heckman (1998) argue that pupils who face the choice of going to university are
already positively selected based on (typically unobserved) ability and motivation.
Students from low income family (those who “make it against the odds”) may be
most strongly selected on these traits (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). Price therefore
plays only a marginal role in deciding whether to go to college or not. Students
from lower social classes in particular may decide that the price of college is only a
minor deterrent.
Indeed, if price plays a role at all, it may be offset with policy measures such as
subsidies and loans. Again, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) argue that only very few
students face serious liquidity constraints when trying to decide about going to
college. These liquidity constrains can easily be addressed by subsidising student
loans or providing other forms of state aid to poor families. And indeed, rising
tuition is usually accompanied by various policy measures to compensate for higher
prices. Governments and universities provide subsidies, fee discounts, loans and
other types of students’ support to target students from lower social strata. In the
United Kingdom, a comprehensive students’ loan programme was implemented
alongside the tuition fees. For all these reasons, we may not know a priori how the
2012 reforms would affect students. The next sections will try to draw up an answer
to this question.
How Did the Latest Increase in Fees … 485
4 Research Design
The ‘causal effect’ of the marketisation reforms will be presented through a
‘difference-in-differences’ design. This is a pseudo-experimental research design
that has become popular in policy studies following pioneering work by Card and
Krueger (1994) in the ﬁeld of labour economics. The intuition behind these designs
is that it is possible to identify a causal effect by comparing trends before and after a
policy has been implemented, using another region where that policy has not been
implemented as a control group.
The marketisation of universities in the United Kingdom follows just such a
pattern. As mentioned earlier, only students from England faced the increase in
tuition fees (see Fig. 1), whereas the situation remained unchanged for students
from Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and for overseas students (non-EU). This
situation thus allows for a pseudo-experimental setting, dividing these groups into
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups, as in Table 2.
Any (semi-) experimental design requires some similarity between treatment and
control groups. While comparability is assured in terms of both observable and
unobservable characteristics of these groups in randomised trials, this is very
Table 2 Division of regions into 12 treatment and 10 control groups
Academic year domicile Group Used for research questions
North East England Treatment All
North West England Treatment All
Yorkshire and the Humber Treatment All
East Midlands Treatment All
West Midlands Treatment All
East of England Treatment All
London Treatment All
South East England Treatment All
South West England Treatment All
Wales Control All
Northern Ireland Control All
Scotland Control All
Africa Control Only for enrolment, not inequality
Asia Control Only for enrolment, not inequality
Australasia Control Only for enrolment, not inequality
Middle East Control Only for enrolment, not inequality
North America Control Only for enrolment, not inequality
Other Europe Control Only for enrolment, not inequality
South America Control Only for enrolment, not inequality
Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man Treatment Only for enrolment, not inequality
England Unknown Treatment Only for enrolment, not inequality
Other European Union Treatment Only for enrolment, not inequality
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unlikely to occur in non-randomised allocation to treatment and control groups.
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the observable characteristics
of the treatment and control groups in this study. Students are broken down by
‘domicile’, which is a variable measuring the address of the student before they
enrolled at university (i.e. most likely their parental home), and hence deﬁnes the
eligibility for a certain fee regime. While the table makes clear that the groups are
comparable in some respects (particularly, class composition), they are different in
other respects (size, age).
The situation presented in Table 3 is quite a typical problem for non-randomised
experiments (Angrist and Pishke 2008), and it indicates that it is impossible to
identify a ‘causal effect’ by comparing the post-treatment situation between treat-
ment and control regions. There may be unobserved characteristics for either the
treatment or the control regions that influence the choices of students. The solution
for this problem is a ‘difference-in-differences’ design that eliminates this problem
of unobserved heterogeneity. Provided that the differences between treatment and
control groups are time-invariant, this research design identiﬁes the causal effect
(i.e. there are no factors that influence only the treated or only the control groups in
the time period that is observed). Below, I will discuss whether it is likely that any
time-variant changes affect either the treatment or control groups.














Students (mean per region) 54,385 45,590 16,075 15,310
Age (mean and standard deviation) 24.52 22.78 25.49 24.26
9.97 8.50 12.27 11.40
Parental social class (UK only)
Service Class 43 % 43 % 41 % 41 %
Middle Class 16 % 16 % 17 % 17 %
Working Class 18 % 20 % 17 % 18 %
Unemployed 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Unknown/not classiﬁed 23 % 19 % 24 % 23 %
Ethnicity (UK only)
White 75 % 73 % 92 % 90 %
Black or Black British 8 % 9 % 1 % 2 %
Asian or Asian British
(Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi)
7 % 8 % 1 % 1 %
Mixed 3 % 4 % 1 % 1 %
Other 4 % 4 % 1 % 1 %
Unknown 2 % 2 % 3 % 5 %
Note Counts rounded to the nearest ﬁve to prevent individual identiﬁcation, percentages rounded
to integers. Source Own calculations based on HESA data
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The simple idea behind the ‘difference-in-differences’ strategy is that it takes the
difference between the treatment and control groups, before and after the treatment.
More formally, the quantity of interest (the causal effect) looks as follows:
E Y1jD ¼ 1½   E Y1jD ¼ 0½   E Y0jD ¼ 1½   E Y0jD ¼ 0½  ð1Þ
where E Y1jD ¼ 1½  is the expected value for the treated group after the treatment,
E Y1jD ¼ 0½  is the expected value for the non-treated group after the treat-
ment, E Y0jD ¼ 1½  is the expected value for the treated group before treatment, and
E Y0jD ¼ 0½  is the expected value for the non-treated group after the treatment.
4.1 Pre-treatment Trends
Figure 2 shows the pre- and post-trend treatments in undergraduate enrolments in the
United Kingdom from the academic year 2004/05 until 2013/14. While it is clear that
the total amount of students from England is much higher than those from the control
groups, the lines do not take a fundamentally different shape before the reform.
4.2 Stability in Composition
Secondly, it is hard for students to escape the fee-regime. Figure 3 shows the
amount of students who are studying in the UK, but are studying outside their
Fig. 2 Parallel trends for undergraduate enrolments in control and treatment regions. The English
line represents an average of all English regions. Source Own calculations based on HESA data
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domicile region (e.g. English students studying in Wales). Naturally, the ﬁgure for
international students is the highest (since none of these are studying at home), but
for the other groups, we see more or less continuous lines. This is understandable
from the perspective of policy, since students cannot easily change the fee-regime
by moving to another country of the United Kingdom. In order to qualify for lower
fees, students would have to move out of England 3 years before applying to
university. This is rather unlikely to happen in large numbers, since the cost of
moving an entire family will probably be higher than the costs of fees.11
4.3 Anticipation Effects in Enrolment Decisions
It is a typical problem in the public policy literature that people may anticipate
policy changes and change their behaviour. The problem in this case is that the
student cohort of 2011/12 may have already foreseen that tuition fees would be
raised by the academic year 2012/13. Some students that would have normally
enrolled in academic year 2012/13 could have enrolled in the previous academic
year to ‘escape’ the higher fees. The Browne review that announced an increase in























2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Academic Year
English (T) Scottish (C)
EU (T) Welsh (C)
Northern Irish (C) International (C)
Fig. 3 Total amount of students studying outside their domicile region. Source Own calculations
based on HESA data
11There have been stories of ‘fee-refugees’, however, the cost of moving to a foreign country may
also be higher than paying the fees. http://www.theguardian.com/education/mortarboard/2012/aug/
24/fee-refugees-disappointed.
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2011/12 academic year. Students who would otherwise defer their enrolment to the
next year, or older students could therefore decide to enrol in the academic year
2011/12. Any analysis of the discontinuity between academic years 2011/12 and
2012/13 may therefore overestimate the causal effect of the fees. In the empirical
section, therefore, I will systematically compare enrolment in the academic year
2010/11 with enrolment in academic year 2013/14.
5 Data and Results
Research on social inequality in education is usually based on general population
surveys (Breen et al. 2009; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993) also in the context of
privatisation reforms (Torche 2005). Such data allow researchers to compare the
social background of students and graduates to the social background in the general
population. Ideally, I would use a longitudinal survey of the general population to
assess whether enrolments in higher education changed before and after the mar-
ketisation. For the research questions asked here, such data either is not available
(yet), does not provide enough detail on the social background of the students, or
suffers from both of these problems.12
Instead, data on student enrolments are drawn from the Higher Education
Statistics Agency (HESA),13 which collects register data14 about students in nearly
all universities in the United Kingdom.15 This data is collected at the individual
level, and contains information about the students’ age, year of study, and social
background and ethnicity. Information on social class is only collected here for
students younger than 21 years old, following the 8-class National Statistics Social
Economic Classiﬁcation (in turn, this is based on the EGP class scheme). Data in
these classes have been collapsed into 4 classes (Service class, Middle Class,
Working Class and Unemployed), allowing for a hierarchical comparison.
In each of the models presented below, the dependent variable is the ‘number of
new enrolments’ (Y for region i and time-period j), while the independent variables
are ‘Treatment’, which is a dummy indicating whether the region is treated or
12The ‘Understanding Society’ survey comes closest, with a sample of 40,000 households who are
followed over time. The number of university enrolments is very limited (typically around 200 per
wave), implying that years of enrolment would have to be collapsed together to get enough
individuals in each cell. Moreover, data for 2012/13 are not yet available at the time of writing.
13HESA does not accept responsibility for any inferences or conclusions derived from the data by
third parties.
14Standard errors and t-statistics lose their usual meaning in this context, since this is not a random
sample. These will be provided below, in any case, to give an idea of the variance of the effect.
Moreover, these may be relevant if we think of a ‘super-population’ of higher education systems in
which marketisation may occur in the future.
15Data is provided here for 158 universities, out of a total of approximately 162 universities in the
United Kingdom.
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control, and ‘Post-period’, which is a dummy indicating the time pre- or
post-treatment as well as the ‘interaction between treatment and post-period’ as the
difference-in-differences estimator. This model looks as follows, and is the same for
each analysis below:
Yij ¼ b1Treatment þ b2Postperiod þ b3Treatment  Postperiod þ eij ð2Þ
Results are presented below in four sections, namely (1) general effects on enrol-
ments in universities, (2) effects on enrolments of students from different age
groups, (3) effects on enrolments of students from different social classes, and
(4) effects on different ethnic groups.
It should be noted here already that the major disadvantage of using only student
data is that they do not allow me to compare the social background of the students to
the social background of the general population. The consequence is that I have to
restrict my dependent variable to the number ofﬁrst-year enrolments in each group of
interest before and after the policy change. The assumption that this analysis makes is
that the social composition of the population did not change in the observed
time-period (between academic year 2010/11 and 2013/14). This analysis cannot be
done at the individual level, but at the regional level at which policies are made (all
individuals are enrolled at university, so there is no variation in enrolment propen-
sity). Thus, while the data are collected at the individual level, they have been
collapsed at the domicile region level (the treatment and control groups discussed
above). For each analysis, I have carried out three main robustness checks: using
more years for the pre- and post-period, using ‘new enrolments as a percentage of the
population’ as a dependent variable, and using Poisson regression models.
Another disadvantage is that ‘enrolments’ do not take into account the differ-
ences between applicants and enrolments (assuming that the former are higher than
the latter). Enrolment data thus provide an incomplete picture of student demand.
On the other hand, enrolment ﬁgures may better represent actual demand for higher
education, since applications may come from people who might not have the
necessary qualiﬁcations to study at university. I will come back to this point in the
discussion of the results.
5.1 First Year Enrolment
Table 4 shows the effects of the marketisation on general enrolment trends (coef-
ﬁcients in column 1—M1). The causal effect is highlighted in bold (the interaction
between treated region and post-period). For the average treatment region, the
number of students declined by just over 8000 students after the reforms. This is
equivalent to a 15 % decrease of student numbers compared to the pre-treatment
period. From a counterfactual perspective, this means that there were around 72,000
students who would have enrolled in England if the reforms had not been intro-
duced. Figure 4 presents a graph of observed and counterfactual trends in the
treatment and control regions.
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Table 4 Coefﬁcients for general models where dependent variable is count of ﬁrst year
enrolments, and the unit of analysis is the region of domicile








New enrolments as %








38,310** 39,550*** −0.01 1.219***
(10,305) (10,115) (0.009) 0.003
Post-period −770 −295 −0.006 −0.049***




−8030*** −9915*** −0.012 −0.127***
(1510) (2090) (0.006) 0.004
Constant 16,075* 15,460* 0.121*** 9.685***
(5755) (5515) (0.007) 0.002
r2 0.396 0.415 0.377
bic 1018 5057 −125.996 738580.368
N 44 220 24 44
Note Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the domicile level. Estimates and standard errors
in model 1 and 2 are rounded to nearest 5 to preserve anonymity. Source Own calculations based























2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Pre and Post–Treatment
Fig. 4 Observed and counterfactual trends in university enrolments in treatment and control
regions. Predicted effects (based on predicted probabilities) for counterfactual after treatment.
Source Own calculations based on HESA data
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It is clear from Fig. 3 that there has been a substantial drop in enrolment following
marketisation, which may prove costly for English society on the long run. This
ﬁgure may surprise some, since earlier releases (UCAS 2012) reported the reduction
in acceptances to be substantially smaller (around 5.5 %). There could be two
potential explanations for this divergence. First, UCAS does not record enrolments as
such, meaning that students may still have decided not to enrol after being accepted.
Secondly, UCAS seems to report new enrolments in general, while the estimation
here is based on new enrolments in undergraduate programmes (i.e. those for which
fees were raised). Another point is that the ﬁnding here is in line with many earlier
ﬁndings on the price-responsiveness of students mentioned earlier.
The three columns to the right (M2–M4) provide various robustness checks on
these results. The second column (M2) shows that the results also hold when all
previous years for which I have data are used as controls (2004–2011). The effect is
now bigger in terms of the point estimate (−9915) as well as in percentage terms
(18 %). The third column of coefﬁcients (M3) shows that the decline in student
numbers holds when checking for changes in the population of young people. This
speciﬁcation uses the number of new enrolments as a proportion of the total 18–
24 year old population (based on yearly population estimates from the Ofﬁce for
National Statistics).16 The effect size is obviously much smaller, but comparable to
the other effect sizes in terms of percentage change, namely −16 %. The fourth
column (M4) shows a Poisson regression with the same speciﬁcation. Poisson
models are developed to analyse count-data (such as in this case, the number of
students). This model yields the same size and direction of the effect (−18 % in
terms of marginal effect), and is also statistically signiﬁcant.
5.2 Enrolment for Different Age Groups
As outlined in the section on expectations, different groups of students may face
different costs and beneﬁts from attending higher education. Table 5 shows the
effects broken down for different age groups (full regression results in Appendix 1).
While school-leavers (16/18 years old) are almost unaffected by the reforms, all
older students are strongly affected.
The results indicate that students from these different age groups have reacted
differently to the marketisation process. While younger students seem not to have
reacted at all, the picture is quite different for older students. By far the biggest
effect is visible for students who are older than 30, for which we observe a decrease
by about 1/3 in enrolments.
16This has become the standardized base population used in studies of student demand. In effect,
the 18–24 year old population is seen as the population that is most likely to enroll. See Leslie and
Brinkman (1987) in the references for a discussion of this base.
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5.3 Enrolment for Different Social Classes
As argued above, one of the main questions in the debate was whether inequality
between students would increase. Table 6 presents a summary of the results for the
different social classes (full regression tables in Appendix 1). Since it is likely that
older students are more prominently from working class backgrounds, it should be
noted here already that these results are probably biased (I will come back to this
point in the discussion). The estimates indicate a heterogeneous effect of the tuition
fees.
While there is a small decline for upper and middle class students, there is an
increase in students with parents in the working class or among the unemployed.
Further investigation of the data showed that the results also hold if we compare the
class background of 18 year olds versus 21 year olds (results not presented here due
to space limitations). The results hold when using all years as a control. Using
proportions of students in each social class as a proportion of total population in the
same social class (using census data from 2011) does not change the estimates.
When using Poisson regression, however, the effect size becomes statistically
non-signiﬁcant. This means that some caution is warranted in interpreting these
changes as a decrease in inequality (note, however, that these are register data, and
thus statistical signiﬁcance does not carry its conventional meaning).
Table 5 Effect sizes for different age groups
Age group Absolute change in treated regions Percentage change (%)
16 to 18 years −135 students −1
19/21 years −1995 students −12
22/30 years old −2070 students −23
30 and older −3805 students −34
Note The unit of analysis is the region of domicile (standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
domicile level). Estimates and standard errors in model 1 and 2 are rounded to nearest 5 to preserve
anonymity. Source Own calculations based on HESA data. Full regression output in Appendix 1
Table 6 Effect sizes for different social classes
Parental social class Absolute change in treated regions Percentage change (%)
Service class −535 −3
Middle class −125 −2
Working class +520 +7
Unemployed +10 +19
Note Parental social class is recorded only for students under 22 years of age, domiciled in the
United Kingdom. The unit of analysis is the region of domicile (standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the domicile level). Estimates and standard errors in model 1 and 2 are rounded to
nearest 5 to preserve anonymity. Source Own calculations based on HESA data. Full regression
output in Appendix 1
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5.4 Enrolment for Different Ethnic Groups
One less investigated area of inequality in British higher education is ethnicity.
Table 7 presents the results of the analysis for the largest ethnic groups (full
regression results in Appendix 1). The table makes clear that all ethnic groups are
negatively affected by the 2012 reforms, although to different extents. Whites,
blacks and others face the strongest decreases (ranging between 8 and 10 %).
Asians (including Indian British, Pakistaki British and Bangladeshi British) and
mixed groups face a smaller decline (between 3 and 4 %).
While some may interpret these effects as a slight decrease in inequality between
whites and other ethnic groups, caution is warranted. As Table 3 showed, whites
make up more than 70 % of all students in English universities, and over 90 % of
students in the control regions. Even after the reforms, whites are still by far the
dominant group in all British universities. Rather, we can conclude from this the
2012 reforms did not exacerbate the existing inequalities between ethnic groups in
English universities.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has provided a ﬁrst analysis of how the 2012/13 reforms of the English
higher education system have affected student enrolments. It has investigated four
main effects, namely, on general enrolment patterns, on enrolment patterns of
speciﬁc age groups, on different social classes and different ethnic groups. It has
found that enrolments have declined substantially after the marketisation, particu-
larly for older students and those from the middle and service class.
In terms of enrolment trends, the results are on the side of the pessimists. There
has been a serious drop in enrolments following the marketisation reforms. The
results indicate also that young and older students respond differently to marketi-
sation. Whereas young people’s decisions to go to university are almost unaffected,
the decisions of older people are negatively affected. This may be a representation
Table 7 Effect sizes for different ethnic groups
Ethnicity Absolute change in treated regions Percentage change (%)
White −4895 students −10
Black or Black British −380 students −8
Asian or Asian British −130 students −3
Mixed −75 students −4
Other −190 students −8
Note Ethnic group is recorded only for students domiciled in the United Kingdom. The unit of
analysis is the region of domicile (standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the domicile level).
Estimates and standard errors in model 1 and 2 are rounded to nearest 5 to preserve anonymity.
Source Own calculations based on HESA data. Full regression output in Appendix 1
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of different incentive structures facing younger and older students. The higher price
may be driving older students off the market. If lifelong learning remains a policy
goal, then this may require a policy response. Little is still known about the
characteristics of older students, and more research would be needed to ﬁll this gap.
In terms of social inequality, however, the evidence seems to point towards the
optimist view. But we have to interpret this ﬁnding with some caution. There has
been a drop in enrolments from the service class and middle class, while we can
observe a small increase from working class or unemployed backgrounds.
Moreover, white students were slightly more affected than other ethnic groups. This
could point to the success of policies to shield lower income students from the
higher prices (i.e. the extensive loans and grants programme). However, it may also
be that students from lower social classes and non-whites are more strongly selected
on unobserved traits (ability, motivation). As mentioned earlier, it is also quite
likely that there are more working class students in the older age groups. Since the
drop in enrolment for these older groups is much higher than for younger students,
it is still possible that social inequality has remained stable (or has increased).
Moreover, service class students are still strongly over-represented.
The question remains why different groups respond differently to marketisation.
While this paper has not investigated the decision-making mechanisms of students,
a number of candidate explanations are offered by the theory. Older students may
perceive that they face both higher costs and lower beneﬁts. While the ﬁnancial cost
is the same, older students may perceive the costs as higher due to added social
costs (giving up a job, family life, etc.). They may also more negatively assess their
chances of reaping beneﬁts from studying in terms of labour market returns. This
makes their overall assessment of risks higher, and therefore lower older students’
propensity to enrol at university. Future research on the micro-mechanisms of
student choices could clarify these questions.
These results may be sobering for both optimistic and pessimistic sides of the
debate. As many countries are considering to increase fees or to introduce other
market mechanisms, they may realise that this may come at a cost. Higher fees may
deter substantial numbers of students, and particularly affect older students. On the
other hand, the results make clear that the marketisation—particularly if combined
with student support mechanisms—will not necessarily affect class inequality or
inequality between ethnic groups. While future research may shed further light on
these questions, these ﬁndings will hopefully lead to a more informed reflection on
the role of tuition fees and student support in (higher) education.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Appendix 1: Full Regression Results for Age Groups,
Parental Social Classes and Ethnic Groups
Age Groups. Coefﬁcients for models for speciﬁc age-groups where dependent
variable is count of ﬁrst year enrolments, and the unit of analysis is the region of
domicile (standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the domicile level). Estimates
and standard errors rounded to the nearest 5 to preserve anonymity.
16 to
18 years












Treatment group 9730** 9280** 5380** 7830***
(2630) (2620) (1580) (2040)
Post-period 250* −10 −365** −305
(120) (110) (125) (200)
Treated in post-period
(causal effect)
−330 −2480*** −2005*** −3420***
(200) (480) (390) (660)
Constant 4000* 3840* 2655** 2515
(1515) (1400) (930) (1215)
r2 0.4 0.361 0.354 0.404
bic 903 898 849 871
N 44 44 44 44
Source Own calculations based on HESA data. Signiﬁcance levels *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001
Social Classes. Coefﬁcients for models for speciﬁc social classes where
dependent variable is count of ﬁrst year enrolments, and the unit of analysis is the
















Treatment group 7810* 2520* 3210* 20
(3380) (1030) (1065) (20)
Post-period −60 −95 20 60
(170) (50) (80) (40)
Treated in post-period
(causal effect)
−535 −130 520* 10
(275) (115) (215) (50)
Constant 8890** 3700*** 3860*** 35*
(2285) 440 (505) (15)
(continued)









r2 0.237 0.196 0.292 0.204
bic 497 449 454 284
N 24 24 24 24
Source Own calculations based on HESA data. Signiﬁcance levels *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001
Ethnic Groups. Coefﬁcients for models for speciﬁc social classes where
dependent variable is count of ﬁrst year enrolments, and the unit of analysis is the
















Treatment group 11,390 4595 4075* 1670* 1840
(9135) (2985) (1445) (695) (1220)
Post-period −3630 14** −5 35* −75




−4895 −380 −130 −75 −190
(2260) (335) (165) (55) (205)
Constant 35,280*** 334* 574* 427* 540*
(7805) (145) (225) (140) (185)
r2 0.18 0.079 0.226 0.175 0.08
bic 530 503 468 433 458
N 24 24 24 24 24
Source Own calculations based on HESA data. Signiﬁcance levels *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001
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